Reciprocity and the Political Economy of Harmonization and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures
AbstractThis Paper discusses the issue of regulatory protectionism and its implication for reciprocity and international bargaining on regulation. In a simple two way trade model a la Brander and Spencer, we take into account the three following features of regulatory measures: a) a regulation raises the cost not only of foreign producers but also of domestic producers; b) a regulation also creates a fixed cost which is entirely supported by foreign exporters; c) a regulation may provide a welfare gain valued per se by individuals or to correct some market failure. In this context, we investigate the political economy forces for unilateral regulatory protectionism and the effectiveness of various intra-sectorial bargaining schemes (negotiated reciprocal regulation setting, harmonization or mutual recognition agreements) to ensure reciprocal market access.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3147.
Date of creation: Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-14 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Costinot, Arnaud, 2008.
"A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Agreements on Product Standards,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt09f6660d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Costinot, Arnaud, 2008. "A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 197-213, May.
- Katia Berti & Rod Falvey, . "Does Trade Weaken product Quality Standards?," Discussion Papers 11/24, University of Nottingham, GEP.
- Swinnen, Johan F.M. & Vandemoortele, Thijs, 2008. "The Political Economy of Nutrition and Health Standards in Food Markets," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44364, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Alberto AMURGO PACHECO, 2006. "Mutual Recognition Agreements and Trade Diversion: Consequences for Developing Nations," IHEID Working Papers 20-2006, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Jun 2007.
- A. Mantovani & M. Vancauteren, 2003. "The Harmonization of Technical Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an application to EU Environmental Data," Working Papers 480, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Toulemonde, Eric, 2013. "A welfare analysis of the principle of mutual recognition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-16.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.