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Mutual Recognition Agreements and Trade Diversion: Consequences for Developing Nations

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Author Info
Alberto AMURGO PACHECO () (IUHEI, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva)

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Abstract

This paper presents a baseline model that illustrates the implications of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for excluded nations. The model shows that MRAs can harm third country exports because of a trade-diversion effect. We use highly disaggregated trade data from developed and developing nations to test whether or not MRAs have a negative effect on exports from excluded nations. In particular, we focus on the impact of a North-North MRA on the South. We find empirical evidence in support of the model; the MRA between the EU and the USA has harmed exports from Canada and the group of developing countries included in the study.

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Paper provided by Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies in its series HEI Working Papers with number 20-2006.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: 26 Oct 2006
Date of revision: Jun 2007
Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp20-2006

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Related research
Keywords: International Economics; economic integration; Trade Policy; economic development; mutual recognition agreements; MRA; standards; trade diversion; zeros; cournot; quality; inspection; Canada; Mexico; USA; EU; European Union; FTA; TBT; regionalism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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References listed on IDEAS
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  4. Baldwin, Richard, 2000. "Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-Tier World Trade System," CEPR Discussion Papers 2574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jacques Pelkmans, 2003. "Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective," Economics Working Papers 016, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1384, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Garth Saloner, 1987. "Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 165-186, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Riezman, Raymond, 1991. "Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 267-283, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2004. "Regionalism in standards - good or bad for trade?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3458, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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