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Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations

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  • Martin K. Perry
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    Abstract

    This article examines "consistent" conjectural variations in an oligopoly model with a homogeneous product. A conjectural variation is consistent if it is equivalent to the optimal response of the other firms at the equilibrium defined by that conjecture. When the number of firms is fixed, we find that competitive behavior is consistent when marginal costs are constant, but that when marginal costs are rising, the consistent conjectural variation will be between competitive and Cournot behavior. Finally, if we allow free entry and redefine consistency to account for such, then only competitive behavior will be consistent.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
    Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
    Pages: 197-205

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:spring:p:197-205

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    Cited by:
    1. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Market Structure and Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information," International Trade 0402004, EconWPA.
    2. Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2012. "The evolution of the mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 12/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Robert Michaels, 1989. "Conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent-seeking models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 31-39, January.
    4. Andreas Lange, 2012. "On the Endogeneity of Market Power in Emissions Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(4), pages 573-583, August.
    5. Ludovic A. Julien & Olivier Musy & Aurélien W. Saidi, 2011. "The Stackelberg equilibrium as a consistent conjectural equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 938-949.

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