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International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy

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Author Info
Barbara J. Spencer
James A. Brander

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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R&D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Domestic net welfare improves by capturing a greater share of the output of rent earning industries, although the subsidy-ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. Behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three-stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that government is the first player allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions by the firm.

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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 518.

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Length: 36
Date of creation: 1982
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:518

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Basevi, Giorgio, 1970. "Domestic Demand and Ability to Export," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 330-37, March-Apr. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Flaherty, M Therese, 1980. "Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1187-1209, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Frenkel, Jacob A, 1971. "On Domestic Demand and Ability to Export," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 668-72, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
  9. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Gilbert, Richard J & Harris, Richard G, 1981. "Investment Decisions with Economies of Scale and Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 172-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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