Beat 'em or Join 'em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets
AbstractThis paper is concerned with comparing adversarial with co-operative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. Because the government cannot commit to an export subsidy, such a policy may reduce welfare relative to free trade. However, except when spillovers are high, free trade may be inferior to strategic trade policy, even if firms are encouraged to engage in cooperative R&D.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n700897.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
research and development; R&D spillovers; co-operative agreements; research joint ventures (RJV's); strategic trade policy; export subsidies; commitment; dynamic consistency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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- Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2004.
"Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility,"
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Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 195-209, October.
- Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2001. "Rivalry in Uncertain Export Markets: Commitment versus Flexibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2771, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2008. "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 017, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
- Leahy, Dermot & Naghavi, Alireza, 2006.
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- Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2006. "Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs. Joint Ventures," Working Papers 2006.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Alireza Naghavi, 2003. "Strategic Intellectual Property Protection Policy and North-South Technology Transfer," Working Papers 200313, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
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