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Strategic Intellectual Property Protection Policy and North-South Technology Transfer Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Alireza Naghavi (University College Dublin)
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I analyze the welfare implications of protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in developing countries through its impact on innovation, market structure, and technology transfer. FDI, tariffs, and joint ventures (JV) are introduced to the strategic IPR literature. In a North-South trade environment, the South sets the IPR policy strategically by anticipating the Northern firm’s R&D expenditure and multinationalization decision. A stringent IPR policy is always chosen in order to motivate technology transfer through FDI, which in turn improves welfare. JVs bring in more profits for the Southern firm, but FDI is the optimal form of transfer in terms of welfare.
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Paper provided by School Of Economics, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number
200313.
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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 19 Apr 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200313Contact details of provider: Postal: UCD, Belfield, Dublin 4 Phone: +353-1-7067777 Fax: +353-1-283 0068 Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/economics More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: intellectual property rights ; technology transfer ; multinational firms ; joint ventures ; North-South trade ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Government Policy
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