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International Protection of Intellectual Property

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  • Gene M Grossman
  • Edwin L Lai

Abstract

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation, and in their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000000442.

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Date of creation: 16 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000442

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  1. McCalman, Phillip, 2001. "Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 161-186, October.
  2. Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
  3. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2004. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1635-1653, December.
  4. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
  5. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Parallel Imports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(9), pages 1269-1284, 09.
  6. Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Economics Working Papers E01-305, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Phillip McCalman, 2001. "National patents, innovation and international agreements," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14.
  8. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 99, 1st quart.
  9. Helpman, E., 1992. "Innovation, Imitation and intellectual Property Rights," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1597, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Judith C. Chin & Gene M. Grossman, 1991. "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade," NBER Working Papers 2769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Lai, Edwin L. -C. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 183-209, January.
  12. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt3pr2040r, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  13. Ginarte, Juan C. & Park, Walter G., 1997. "Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 283-301, October.
  14. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1383g11z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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