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International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment

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Author Info
Leahy, Dermot
Neary, J Peter

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Abstract

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 322-38
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Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:4:y:1996:i:3:p:322-38

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576

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  1. J Peter Neary, 2001. "Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality," Working Papers 200102, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Praveen Kujal & Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Policy Synchronization and Staggering in a Dynamic Model of Strategic Trade," International Trade 0302003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Praveen Kujal & Juan Ruiz, 2003. "International Trade Policy towards Monopolies and Oligopolies," International Trade 0302002, EconWPA, revised 17 Mar 2003. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dermot Leahy, J. Peter Neary, 2001. "Robust rules for industrial policy open economies," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 393-409, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Barros,P.P. & Nilssen,T., 1999. "Industrial policy and firm heterogeneity," Memorandum 02/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. J.P. Neary & P O''Sullivan, 1998. "Beat Em or Join Em: Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," CEP Discussion Papers dp0408, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  7. J.P. Neary, 1997. "Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs and Subsidies to High Technology Industries," CEP Discussion Papers dp0346, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Carsten Eckel, 2003. "Does globalization lead to specialization?," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 20, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany).. [Downloadable!]
  9. Lynda Porter, 2003. "Cost Asymmetry and Taxation - Implications for Multinational Activity," Working Papers 200311, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  10. José Luis Moraga & Jean-Marie Viaene, 1999. "Endogenous Quality Effects of Trade Policy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-094/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 2000. "Robust Rules for Industrial Policy in open Economies," Working Papers 200021, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Dermot Leahy & J Peter Neary, 2004. "Symmetric Research Joint Ventures - Cooperative Substitutes and Complements," Working Papers 200417, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 1999. "Multinational Firms, Technology and Location," Working Paper Series 512, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 02 Nov 2000. [Downloadable!]
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  14. D Leahy & J.P. Neary, 1998. "Strategic Trade and Industrial PolicyTowards Dynamic Oligopolies," CEP Discussion Papers dp0409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Kresimir Zigic, 2001. "Strategic Trade Policy, the "Committed" versus "Non-Committed" Government, and R&D Spillovers," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp177, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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