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Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures

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  • Alireza Naghavi

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  • Dermot Leahy

    ()

Abstract

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North-South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics in its series Center for Economic Research (RECent) with number 017.

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Length: pages 26
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mod:recent:017

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Web page: http://www.recent.unimore.it/
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Keywords: North-South Joint Ventures; Intellectual Property Rights; FDI Policy; Technology Transfer; R&D Spillovers;

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  1. Neary, J Peter, 1998. "Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 1916, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. J Peter Neary; & Paul O'Sullivan, 1997. "Beat 'em or Join 'em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n700897, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  3. Das, Satya P, 1999. "Direct Foreign Investment versus Licensing," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 86-97, February.
  4. Dermot Leahy & J Peter Neary, 2004. "Symmetric Research Joint Ventures - Cooperative Substitutes and Complements," Working Papers 200417, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
  5. J Peter Neary, 2002. "The Road Less Travelled - Oligopoly and Competition Policy in General Equilibrium," Working Papers 200222, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
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  7. Neary, J. Peter, 2004. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 34, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  8. Alireza Naghavi, 2007. "Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 55-78, April.
  9. Ping Lin & Kamal Saggi, 2004. "Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in International Joint Ventures," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 279-294, 05.
  10. Vishwasrao, Sharmila, 1994. "Intellectual property rights and the mode of technology transfer," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 381-402, August.
  11. Beata S. Javorcik & Kamal Saggi, 2010. "Technological Asymmetry Among Foreign Investors And Mode Of Entry," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 415-433, 04.
  12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
  13. Saggi, Kamal, 1996. "Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 99-104, February.
  14. Al-Saadon, Yousef & Das, Satya P., 1996. "Host-country policy, transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures: A theoretical analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 345-364, May.
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