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Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

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Author Info
Marco, MARINUCCI (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

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Abstract

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partnersÕ effort is not obervable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JVÕs profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2008016.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: 18 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008016

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Related research
Keywords: Joint ventures; strategic alliances; ownership structure; asymmetries;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Reinhilde Veugelers & Katrien Kesteloot, 1996. "Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 23-51, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 761-781, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Yannis Caloghirou & Stavros Ioannides & Nicholas S. Vonortas, 2003. "Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(4), pages 541-570, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2000. "Optimal Ownership Structures in Asymmetric Joint Ventures," Working Papers 411, Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hagedoorn, John & Link, Albert N. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2000. "Research partnerships1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 567-586, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Shige Makino & Paul W Beamish, 1998. "Performance and Survival of Joint Ventures with Non-Conventional Ownership Structures," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 29(4), pages 797-818, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Linda Longfellow Blodgett, 1991. "Partner Contributions as Predictors of Equity Share in International Joint Ventures," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 63-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello & Milind M. Shrikhande, 2002. "Structuring International Cooperative Ventures," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 1251-1282.
  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Anbarci, Nejat & Lemke, Robert & Roy, Santanu, 2002. "Inter-firm complementarities in R&D: a re-examination of the relative performance of joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 191-213, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ping Lin & Kamal Saggi, 2004. "Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in International Joint Ventures," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 279-294, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Elizabeth Asiedu & Hadi Salehi Esfahani, 2001. "Ownership Structure In Foreign Direct Investment Projects," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 647-662, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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