Pricing behaviour at capacity constrained facilities
AbstractEntry of new firms can be difficult or even impossible at capacity constrained facilities, despite the actual cost of entering is low. Using a game theoretic model of incumbent firms’ pricing behaviour under these conditions, it is found that under the assumption of Bertrand competition and firms having different costs, the optimal pricing behaviour imply price stickiness and upward pricing. The findings further suggest a competitive behaviour of incumbents of disposing weaker opponents only if, it leads to weaker competitors entering the market and to use weaker opponents to shelter the incumbent. The results propose a new explanation of the mixed empirical findings on incumbent pricing to entry and suggest that competition authorities should use an effect-based approach to detect the behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39362.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Pricing behaviour; capacity constrained; congestion; game theory; competition policy; regulation; games of incomplete and asymmetric information; Bayesian equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-06-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-TRE-2012-06-25 (Transport Economics)
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