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Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game

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Author Info
David J. Cooper
Susan Garvin
John H. Kagel

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Abstract

In an experimental investigation of Milgrom and Roberts' (1992) model, play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium, providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts. Play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima, followed by an attempt to pool, and then (if no pooling equilibrium exists) separation, suggesting myopia rather than a forward-looking process. When both pure-strategy equilibria and separating equilibria exist, equilibrium selection is a function of the past history of play. An adaptive learning model characterizes the major features of the data and provides predictions of intermediate-term behavior that is otherwise lacking in the theory.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199724%2928%3A4%3C662%3ASAALIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 662-683
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:662-683

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  1. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Anderson, Christopher M. & Camerer, Colin F., 1999. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games," Working Papers 1058, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ido Erev & Alvin Roth & Robert Slonim & Greg Barron, 2007. "Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-51, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Juin-Kuan Chong & Colin F. Camerer & Teck H. Ho, 2005. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000537, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. C. Monica Capra et al., 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2007. "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration," NBER Working Papers 13069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. José Luis Lima R. & Javier Nuñez E., 2004. "Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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