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How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines

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Author Info
Austan Goolsbee () (University of Chicago)
Chad Syverson () (University of Chicago)

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Abstract

This paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors, as distinguished from their response to competitors’ actual entry. It uses a case study from the passenger airline industry—specifically, the evolution of Southwest Airlines’ route network—to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly. When Southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself, this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future. We examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events. We find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest’s entry into their routes. This is true even after controlling in several ways for airport-specific operating costs. The response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself, and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where Southwest does not operate (e.g., fares drop on routes from Chicago Midway but not Chicago O’Hare). The largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand. Incumbents do experience short-run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts. This is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer-term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor. We examine evidence relating this demand-building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion. There is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes.

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Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 04-04.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision: Dec 2004
Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0404

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  5. Reiss, Peter C & Spiller, Pablo T, 1989. "Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages S179-202, October.
  6. Klemperer, Paul D, 1987. "Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 99-117, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael D. Whinston & Scott C. Collins, 1992. "Entry and Competitive Structure in Deregulated Airline Markets: An Event Study Analysis of People Express," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 445-462, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Bailey, Elizabeth E, 1981. "Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 178-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Gustavo E. Bamberger & Dennis W. Carlton & Lynette R. Neumann, 2001. "An Empirical Investigation of the Competitive Effects of Domestic Airline Alliances," NBER Working Papers 8197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Severin Borenstein, 1989. "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 344-365, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Robert D. Cairns & John W. Galbraith, 1990. "Artificial Compatibility, Barriers to Entry, and Frequent-Flyer Programs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(4), pages 807-16, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Jan K. Brueckner & Nichola J. Dyer & Pablo T. Spiller, 1992. "Fare Determination in Airline Hub-and-Spoke Networks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 309-333, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Margaret K. Kyle, 2007. "Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade," NBER Working Papers 12968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jon Strand & Michael Keen, 2006. "Indirect Taxes on International Aviation," IMF Working Papers 06/124, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kris Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro, 2007. "The effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry: a panel analysis," Working Papers 07-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  4. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2008. "Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 13830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Yongmin Chen & Scott J. Savage, 2007. "The Effects Of Competition On The Price For Cable Modem Internet Access," Working Papers 07-13, NET Institute, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Claudio Agostini, 2005. "El Mercado de Transporte Aéreo: Lecciones para Chile de una Revisión de la Literatura," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv163, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  7. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2007. "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration," NBER Working Papers 13069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Maria J. Gil-Molto & Claudio A. Piga, 2005. "Entry and Exit in a Liberalised Market," Discussion Paper Series 2005_10, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]
  9. Loreto Lira & Rosario Rivero & Rodrigo Vergara, 2005. "Entry and Prices: Evidence from the Chilean Supermarket Industry," Documentos de Trabajo 299, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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