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Artificial Compatibility, Barriers to Entry, and Frequent-Flyer Programs

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Author Info
Robert D. Cairns
John W. Galbraith

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Abstract

If supplier firms can discriminate between buyers (agents) acting on behalf of employers (principals) and those making purchases for themselves, then these firms may be able to create demand-side entry barriers by creating what may be called "artificial compatibility" between otherwise unrelated goods or services. Even if there are no differences in costs between incumbent and potential entrant, there will be an incentive to offer in-kind inducements to agents; these inducements may lead to entry barriers, and their use may be a Nash equilibrium. We argue that "frequent-flyer" programs are instances of the creation of such artificial compatibility.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 807-16
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:23:y:1990:i:4:p:807-16

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  1. Caminal, Ramón & Claici, Adina, 2005. "Are loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes anti-competitive?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, 2005. "How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines," NBER Working Papers 11072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Claudio Agostini, 2005. "El Mercado de Transporte Aéreo: Lecciones para Chile de una Revisión de la Literatura," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv163, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
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