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Regionalism and Multilaterialism: A Political Economy Approach

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  • Pravin Krishna

Abstract

Preferential trading arrangements are analyzed from the viewpoint of the "new political economy" that views trade policy as being determined by lobbying of concentrated interest groups. Two conclusions are reached: first, that tradediverting preferential arrangements are more likely to be supported politically; and second, that such preferential arrangements could critically change domestic incentives so multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement. The larger the trade diversion resulting from the preferential arrangement, the more likely this will be the case. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 96-5.

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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-5

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. de Melo, Jaime & Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The new regionalism : a country perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1094, The World Bank.
  3. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  4. de Melo, Jaime & Montenegro, Claudio & Panagariya, Arvind, 1992. "Regional integration, old and new," Policy Research Working Paper Series 985, The World Bank.
  5. Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
  7. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.
  8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade Areas," Discussion Papers 1048, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Paul Krugman, 1989. "Is Bilateralism Bad?," NBER Working Papers 2972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-19, September.
  12. Stern, R.M. & Deardorff, A.V., 1992. "Multilateral Trade Negociations and Preferential Trading Arrangements," Working Papers 307, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
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