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International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy

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Author Info
Robert W. Staiger

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Abstract

What are the potential benefits from establishing international rules for the conduct of trade policy and how should these rules be designed? These questions are of central importance to the evolution of national trade policies in the post-war era, a period in which an elaborate system of international rules has evolved to facilitate the process of reciprocal trade liberalization. Yet the theory of trade policy has traditionally had little to say about these rules and the issues that underlie them. Below I review and synthesize several of the currents of a growing literature that is concerned with these questions. I attempt to accomplish three objectives: To describe the basic structure of international trade agreements as they exist in practice; to explore theoretically the normative consequences of actual and alternative trade agreements; and to offer some theoretically-based explanation for the structure of trade agreements that we observe. I attempt to achieve the first objective by describing the important features of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. I attempt to achieve the latter two objectives by reviewing a body of literature and drawing out its implications as they relate to these issues.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4962.

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Date of creation: Dec 1994
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Publication status: published as in G.M. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Hanbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, 1995. The Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, North Holland, 1995.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4962

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  1. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Time Inconsistency of Trade Policy and Multilateralism," International Trade 0402002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1036, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pravin Krishna, . "Regionalism and Multilaterialism: A Political Economy Approach," Working Papers 96-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2003. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach," NBER Working Papers 9631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ronald D. Fischer & 1998, 1998. "Contingent protection as better insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 49, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Francois, Joseph & Martin, Will, 2002. "Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access," CEPR Discussion Papers 3294, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. James E. Anderson, 1999. "Why Do Nations Trade (So Little)?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 428, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ben Zissimos, 2006. "The GATT and Gradualism," Working Papers 0619, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jean-Philippe Gervais, 2001. "Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ben Zissimos, 2006. "The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example," Working Papers 0623, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "Do WTO Members have More Liberal Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 9347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. repec:att:wimass:19199815 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C, 2001. "Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation Clause," CEPR Discussion Papers 2859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Josef Janssen, . "(Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts," Working Papers 1999.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  15. Moonsung Kang, 2000. "Trade Policy Mix and the STO: Protection of TRIPS and R&D Subsidies," Trade Working Papers 130, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Papers 6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s17, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  20. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Imperfect Competition and the Theory of Managed Trade," International Trade 0402003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  21. repec:att:wimass:1919996 is not listed on IDEAS
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