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Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey

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Author Info
Baldwin, Richard

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Abstract

Economic thinking on regionalism has traditionally focused on the Vinerian question: Would a nation gain from joining a trade bloc? Since 1991, "Big Think Regionalism" considers the broader question of regionalism’s impact on the world trading system focusing on two questions: Does spreading regionalism harm world welfare? and Does regionalism help or hinder multilateralism? This paper syntheses and critiques the theoretical literature in an attempt to identify the insights that are useful for thinking about regionalism’s systemic impact in the new century.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6874.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6874

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Related research
Keywords: Multilateralism; Regionalism; Stumbling and building blocks; World trade system;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pamela Bombarda, Elisa Gamberoni, 2008. "Firm Heterogeneity, Rules of Origin and Rules of Cumulation," HEI Working Papers 09-2008, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
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