Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?
AbstractThis paper emphasizes the range of factors which enter country calculations to seek regional trading arrangements. These include conventional access benefits, but extend to safe haven concerns, the use of trade arrangements to underpin security arrangements, and tactical interplay between multilateral and regional trade negotiating positions. In a final section, results from an earlier modelling effort by Perroni and Whalley are used to emphasize that non- traditional objectives may be quantitatively more important than traditionally analyzed objectives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5552.
Date of creation: May 1996
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Publication status: published as John Whalley. "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?," in Jeffrey A. Frankel, editor, "The Regionalization of the World Economy" University of Chicago Press (1998)
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