This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John Whalley

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper emphasizes the range of factors which enter country calculations to seek regional trading arrangements. These include conventional access benefits, but extend to safe haven concerns, the use of trade arrangements to underpin security arrangements, and tactical interplay between multilateral and regional trade negotiating positions. In a final section, results from an earlier modelling effort by Perroni and Whalley are used to emphasize that non- traditional objectives may be quantitatively more important than traditionally analyzed objectives.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5552.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5552.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: May 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: published relationship to a non-chapter. This should not happen. Please contact NBER.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5552

Note: ITI
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Markusen, James R & Wigle, Randall M, 1989. "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 368-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 391-97, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1994. "The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 4626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Hamilton, Bob & Whalley, John, 1983. "Optimal tariff calculations in alternative trade models and some possible implications for current world trading arrangements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 323-348, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 1990. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 70-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Paul Krugman, 1989. "Is Bilateralism Bad?," NBER Working Papers 2972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Shang-Jin Wei, 1995. "The new regionalism and Asia: impact and options," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 95-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Maurice Schiff, 2002. "Chile’s Trade Policy: an Assessment," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 151, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  2. Schiff, Maurice, 2002. "Regional integration and development in small states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2797, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andreas Waldkirch, 2004. "The 'New Regionalism': Integration as a Commitment Device for Developing Countries," International Trade 0412004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Adam, Antonis & Moutos, Thomas, 2002. "The Political Economy of EU Enlargement: Or, Why Japan is not a Candidate Country?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Richard Baldwin, 2007. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Sphagetti Bowls as building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade," Working Papers id:1231, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lucian Cernat, 2001. "ASSESSING REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS: ARE SOUTH–SOUTH RTAs MORE TRADE DIVERTING?," International Trade 0109001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Baldwin, Richard, 2008. "Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Fernandez, Raquel, 1997. "Returns to regionalism : an evaluation of nontraditional gains from regional trade agreements," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1816, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Raquel Fernandez, 1997. "Returns to Regionalism: An Evaluation of Non-Traditional Gains from RTAs," NBER Working Papers 5970, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Eric Bond, 2009. "Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 85-104, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. repec:att:wimass:19199815 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. M. Ayhan Kose & Guy Meredith & Christopher M. Towe, 2004. "How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 04/59, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  13. Paas, Tiiu, 2002. "Gravity Approach for Exploring Baltic Sea Regional Integration in the Field of International Trade," Discussion Paper Series 26379, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Anita Labériotte, 2002. "La viabilité de l'Association des Nations d'Asie du Sud-Est au regard de l'analyse des échanges intra-zone," Documents de travail 68, Groupe d'Economie du Développement de l'Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV. [Downloadable!]
  15. Baldwin, Richard & Rieder, Roland, 2007. "A Test of Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation Theory on EU Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6389, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.