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Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers

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Author Info

  • Hideo Konishi

    ()
    (Boston College)

  • Carsten Kowalczyk

    (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University)

  • Tomas Sjostrom

    (Pennsylvania State University)

Abstract

All countries would agree to immediate global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in the core of a Kemp-Wan-Grinols customs union game.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp568.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 568.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 24 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:568

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Keywords: free trade; customs unions; free trade areas; GATT/WTO; multilateralism; transfers;

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References

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  1. Bagwell, K. & Staiger, R.W., 1994. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Customs Unions," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9404, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  2. Carsten Kowalczyk & Donald R. Davis, 1998. "Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA," NBER Chapters, in: The Regionalization of the World Economy, pages 227-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs 166, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  4. Hideo Konishi & Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjöström, 2009. "Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 304-309, 05.
  5. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
  6. Kowalczyk, C. & Wannacott, R.J., 1992. "Hubs and Spokes , and Free Trade in the Americas," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 9209, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. Chisik, Richard, 2003. "Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 367-397, March.
  8. Carsten Kowalczyk & Ronald J. Wonnacott, 1992. "Hubs and Spokes, and Free Trade in the Americas," NBER Working Papers 4198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2004. "Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 303-320, 08.
  10. Wonnacott, Paul & Wonnacott, Ronald, 1981. "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 704-14, September.
  11. Kowalczyk, Carsten, 2000. "Welfare and Integration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 483-94, May.
  12. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
  13. Kowalczyk, Carsten & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1994. "Bringing GATT into the Core," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(243), pages 301-17, August.
  14. Earl L. Grinols & Kar-yiu Wong, 1991. "An Exact Measure of Welfare Change," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 428-49, May.
  15. Kowalczyk, Carsten & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2000. "Trade as transfers, GATT and the core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 163-169, February.
  16. Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February.
  17. Grandmont, J. M. & McFadden, D., 1972. "A technical note on classical gains from trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-125, May.
  18. Jones, Ronald W, 1969. "Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 418-24, June.
  19. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 1990. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 70-83, February.
  20. Grinols, Earl L., 1981. "An extension of the Kemp-Wan theorem on the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 259-266, May.
  21. Riezman, Raymond, 1985. "Customs unions and the core," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 355-365, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. MACHO-STADLER, Inés & XUE, Licun, 2005. "Does Free Trade Benefit All?," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 13-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Earl Grinols & Peri Silva, 2011. "Rules of origin and gains from trade," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 159-173, May.
  3. Inés Macho-Stadler & Licun Xue, 2006. "Winners and losers from the gradual formation of trading blocs," Working Papers 274, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Eric Bond, 2009. "Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 85-104, October.

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