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Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations

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Author Info
Conconi, P.
Perroni, C.

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Abstract

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp558.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 558.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:558

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Related research
Keywords: TRADE ; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ; NEGOCIATIONS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F0 - International Economics - - General
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1994. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," International Trade 9410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 1990. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 70-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Burbidge, John B. & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Meyers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1997. "A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 940-56, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(02), pages 281-316, March. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1992. "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 388-399, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bond, E.W. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Optimality and Stability of Regional Trading Blocs," Papers 5-93-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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  10. Riezman, Raymond, 1985. "Customs unions and the core," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 355-365, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley & Randall M. Wigle, 1999. "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations," CSGR Working papers series 27/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francis Bloch & Geoffroy De Clippel, 2008. "Cores of combined games," Working Papers hal-00356298_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Conconi, P., 2000. "Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 571, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nuno Limão, 2002. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," International Trade 0206002, EconWPA, revised 28 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Richard Baldwin, 2008. "Big-Think Regionalism: A Critical Survey," NBER Working Papers 14056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2005. "The Making of International Environmental Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 652.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  6. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo & Riezman, Raymond, 2006. "Is Partial Tax Harmonization Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2001. "Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," NBER Working Papers 8347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hoekman, Bernard & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2002. "Economic development, competition policy, and the World Trade Organization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2917, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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