This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Coalition-formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Block s

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John B. Burbidge
James A. DePater
Gordon M. Myers
Abhijit Sengupta

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition's aggregate payoff at a Nash equilib- rium against non-members, and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains. With two states, the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation; with more than two states, incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium. Interpreting this result in temrs of customs unions, the trend to trading bloc formation may be equilibrium behavious even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/deptwp9614.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1996-05.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1996-05

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
    Other versions:
  2. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Participation in a Currency Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 847-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1994. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," International Trade 9410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Wildasin, David E. & Douglas Wilson, John, 1991. "Theoretical issues in local public economics : An overview," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 317-331, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Macho-Stadler & Licun Xue, 2006. "Winners And Losers From The Gradual Formation Of Trading Blocs," Departmental Working Papers 2006-27, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hyejoon Im, 2004. "Trading Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment: Endogenous Coalition Structure," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 532, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nicolas Marceau & Gordon Myers, 2005. "On the Early Holocene: Foraging to Early Agriculture," Cahiers de recherche 0502, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kubota, Keiko, 2000. "Trade negotiations in the presence of network externalities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2317, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Philippe Aghion & Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Negotiating Free Trade," NBER Working Papers 10721, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff & John Leach, 2005. "Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 05001, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. John B. Burbidge & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-05, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2001. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Nicolas Marceau & Gordon M. Myers, 2000. "From Foraging to Agriculture," Discussion Papers dp00-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff & John Leach, 2004. "Capital Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms and Agglomeration Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  12. Paul Frijters & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-053/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Daniel Laskar, 1998. "Coopération monétaire partielle," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 52, pages 05, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
  14. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff, 2002. "Capital Tax Competition and Returns to Scale," Department of Economics Working Papers 2002-10, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. John Whalley, 2005. "Globalization and Values," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Itai Agur, 2007. "The US Trade Deficit, the Decline of the WTO and the Rise of Regionalism," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/17, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  17. Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.