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Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?

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Limao, Nuno

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 67 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 175-199
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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:67:y:2005:i:1:p:175-199

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Conconi, P. & Perroni, C., 2000. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 558, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thursby, Marie & Jensen, Richard, 1983. "A conjectural variation approach to strategic tariff equilibria," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1-2), pages 145-161, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2001. "Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," NBER Working Papers 8347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002. "GATT-think," Discussion Papers 0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Knetter, Michael M, 1993. "International Comparisons of Price-to-Market Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 473-86, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Brian R. Copeland, 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-108, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley & Randall M. Wigle, 1997. "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 6216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9914, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Chang, Won & Winters, L. Alan, 1999. "How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR," CEPR Discussion Papers 2179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(02), pages 281-316, March. [Downloadable!]
  16. Won Chang & Winters, L. Alan, 1999. "How regional blocs affect excluded countries - the price effects of MERCOSUR," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2157, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  17. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. INABA Masaru & NUTAHARA Kengo, 2009. "The Role of Investment Wedges in the Carlstrom-Fuerst Economy and Business Cycle Accounting," Discussion papers 09030, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Limao, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2006. "Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3873, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 69-88, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M Stern, 2002. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," Working Papers 477, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan. [Downloadable!]
  5. Drusilla K. Brown, 2001. "Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 89-112, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. JINJI Naoto, 2009. "An Economic Theory of the SPS Agreement," Discussion papers 09033, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  7. Sumeet Gulati & Devesh Roy, 2007. "How Standards Drive Taxes: The Political Economy of Tailpipe Pollution," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1489-1489. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Petros C. Mavroidis & Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO," Discussion Papers 0405-08, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002. "GATT-think," Discussion Papers 0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. repec:att:wimass:1920314 is not listed on IDEAS
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