We describe recent work on the theory of trade agreements that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. Our discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the purpose of a trade agreement. In both the traditional economic and the political-economy approaches to the study of trade agreements, the problem for a trade agreement to solve is the excessive protection that arises in the absence of an agreement as a consequence of the terms-of-trade externality. Second, we consider the origin and design of GATT. We note that GATT is a rules-based institution whose origin can be traced to the disastrous economic performance that accompanied the high tariffs of the 1920's and 1930's. Finally, we review the theoretical literature that interprets and evaluates the institutional features found in GATT. We consider in particular whether GATT articles can be interpreted as offering negotiation rules that help governments undo the inefficient restrictions in trade that are caused by the terms-of-trade externality. On the whole, our review suggests that the core principles of GATT indeed may be interpreted in this manner. Specifically, we report findings that indicate that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert to remedy the inefficiency created by the terms-of-trade externality. We also extract a variety of predictions from the literature on enforcement and trade policy, and we argue that these predictions are broadly compatible with both the design of GATT and certain historical experiences in trade-policy conduct. We thus interpret the literature reviewed here as providing a strong presumption for the view that GATT can be understood as an institution whose central principles are well-designed to assist governments in their attempt to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. Our review therefore offers support for the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade theory as an appropriate framework within which to interpret and evaluate GATT.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
8005.
Length: Date of creation: Nov 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8005
Note: ITI Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Paper
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002.
"GATT-think,"
Discussion Papers
0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Find related papers by JEL classification: F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982.
"Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Baldwin, Richard E. & Venables, Anthony J., 1995.
"Regional economic integration,"
Handbook of International Economics,
in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1597-1644
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999.
"An Economic Theory of GATT,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988.
"Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995.
"Protection and the Business Cycle,"
Discussion Papers
1130, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990.
"A Theory of Managed Trade,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989.
"A Theory of Managed Trade,"
Discussion Papers
801, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Paolo Epifani & Juliette Vitaloni, 2003.
"‘GATT-Think’ with Asymmetric Countries,"
CESPRI Working Papers
141, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Mar 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: