Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dan Kovenock
  • Marie Thursby

Abstract

This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from 'international obligation," a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GAIT-DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4071.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4071.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Economics and Politics Volume 4, #2, pp. 151-170 (July 1992).
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4071

Note: ITI
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September.
  2. Riezman, Raymond G., 1990. "Dynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 720, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Chan, Kenneth S., 1988. "Trade negotiations in a Nash bargaining model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 353-363, November.
  5. Brown, Fred & Whalley, John, 1980. "General Equilibrium Evaluations of Tariff-Cutting Proposals in the Tokyo Round and Comparisons with More Extensive Liberalisation of World Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(363), pages 838-66, December.
  6. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-33, November.
  7. Segerstrom, Paul S., 1988. "Demons and repentance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 32-52, June.
  8. Baldwin, Robert E. & Clarke, Richard N., 1987. "Game-modeling multilateral trade negotiations," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 257-284.
  9. Hungerford, T.L., 1990. "Gatt: A Cooperative Equilibrium In A Noncooperative Trading Regime?," Working Papers, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 262, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  10. Ludema, R.D., 1990. "Optimal International Trade Agreements And Dispute Settlement Procedures," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 9101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  11. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
  12. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1987. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," NBER Working Papers 2374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. repec:fth:michin:262 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4071. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.