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A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining

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Crawford, Vincent P

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 50 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 607-37
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:607-37

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  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud, 1984. "Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2205, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ferdinand von Siemens, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers 57, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil, 2006. "Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1190, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1998. "Subsidiarity and the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Helmut Bester & Joszef Sakovics, . "Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation," Papers 007, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 4071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "War or Peace," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1052-1052. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav & Daniel Quint, 2004. "Multilateral Bargaining With Concession Costs," Working Papers wp2004_0415, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Why do lions get the lion's share? A Hobbesian theory of agreements," ESE Discussion Papers 37, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  12. Segendorff, Björn, 2001. "Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 461, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  14. Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Harold Houba, . "Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-095/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  16. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Gueth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E. van, 2002. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
  19. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  20. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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