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On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

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Author Info
Martin, Alberto
Vergote, Wouter

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium. We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 76 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 61-77
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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:76:y:2008:i:1:p:61-77

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thomas Klitgaard & Karen Schiele, 1998. "Free versus fair trade: the dumping issue," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug. [Downloadable!]
  2. Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
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  3. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  4. Feenstra, Robert C & Lewis, Tracy R, 1991. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1287-307, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. repec:att:wimass:1920423 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1997. "The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 230-45, May.
  7. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  14. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," International Trade 0411003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 455-475, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information," NBER Working Papers 14812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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