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Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?

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Author Info
Bown, Chad P.
Abstract

Antidumping and related trade remedies are the most popular policy instruments that many of the largest importing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system use to restrict international trade. While such trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the WTO, given that Panel and Appellate Body rulings have almost invariably found that some aspect of each reviewed remedy was inconsistent with WTO obligations, an open research question is why aren't more remedies targeted by dispute settlement? The author provides a first empirical investigation of the trade remedy and WTO dispute settlement interaction by focusing on determinants of WTO members'decisions of whether to formally challenge U.S. trade remedies imposed between 1992 and 2003. He provides evidence that it is not only the size of the economic market at stake and the capacity to retaliate under potential DSU (dispute settlement understanding)-authorized sanctions that influence the litigation decision of whether to formally challenge a measure at the WTO. The author also finds that if the negatively affected foreign industry has the capacity to directly retaliate through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and measure of its own, its government is less likely to pursue the case on its behalf at the WTO. This is consistent with the theory that potential complainants may be avoiding WTO litigation in favor of pursuing reciprocal antidumping and hence"vigilante justice."

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3540.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3540

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Keywords: TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Economic Theory&Research; Trade and Services; World Trade Organization; Trade Policy;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. James P. Durling, 2003. "Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 125-153, March.
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The Economics of the World Trading System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524341.
  3. Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole," Departmental Working Papers 199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bown, Chad P., 2002. "Why are safeguards under the WTO so unpopular?," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 47-62, March. [Downloadable!]
  8. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Holmes, Peter & Rollo, Jim & Young, Alasdair R., 2003. "Emerging trends in WTO dispute settlement : back to the GATT?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3133, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 746-69, October.
  11. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 811-823, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  13. Van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & Van Praag, Bernard M. S., 1981. "The demand for deductibles in private health insurance : A probit model with sample selection," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 229-252, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. repec:att:wimass:1920423 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004. "Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?," MPRA Paper 5416, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," International Trade 0411003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Tarullo, Daniel K., 2003. "Paved with good intentions: the dynamic effects of WTO review of anti-dumping action," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 373-393, November. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause," NBER Working Papers 10987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Sykes, Alan O., 2003. "The safeguards mess: a critique of WTO jurisprudence," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 261-295, November. [Downloadable!]
  20. John Greenwald, 2003. "WTO Dispute Settlement: an Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 113-124, March.
  21. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C & Nordström, Håkan, 1999. "Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bown, Chad P. & Bernard M., Hoekman, 2007. "Developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements : why dispute settlement is not enough," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4450, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bown, Chad P., 2006. "The World Trade Organization and antidumping in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4014, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bown, Chad P., 2009. "The global resort to antidumping, safeguards, and other trade remedies amidst the economic crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5051, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Chad P. Bown, 2007. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Working Papers 13349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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