The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making
AbstractThe paper studies the determinants of trade policy decisions, focusing specifically on antidumping and countervailing duty statutes administered by the International Trade Commission (ITC). Using detailed industry, import, and political pressure data, ITC decision making is modeled, weighing the relative impact of economic and political factors in predicting policy outcomes. It is found that the ITC's decision making is significantly influenced by both economic and political factors. However, because an industry has much greater ability to create political pressure than induce economic injury, the results highlight the strategic importance of oversight representation and PAC contributions in an industry's bid for protection. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576
Other versions of this item:
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making," Departmental Working Papers 199621, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Hoekman, B.M. & Leidy, M.P., 1989. "Dumping, Antidumping, And Emergency Protection," Working Papers 246, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- repec:fth:michin:246 is not listed on IDEAS
- Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "The Road Most Taken: the Rise of Title VII Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 295-313, 03.
- Silberman, Jonathan I & Durden, Garey C, 1976. "Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 317-29, April.
- Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
- Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June.
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
- Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
- Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
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