An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumoing, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases
AbstractThis paper attempts to determine the economic factors that best explain the decisions of the International Trade Commission in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases, utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation. We also consider the extent to which these factors measure the injury conditions and causation relationships specified in U.S. trade laws. Our analyses yield mixed results. For example, while the Commission tends to require declining profits and employment in an industry before recommending import protection in safeguard cases -- as specified in the law, it is not clear that it delineates between serious injury caused by increased imports and serious injury due to other factors. Similarly, in countervailing duty and antidumping cases, economic conditions, such as changes in industry shipments and the degree of capacity utilization, are taken into consideration in material injury decisions, but other factors one would expect to be associated with affirmative decisions, e.g., the ratio of unfair imports to consumption, do not seem to playa significant role. Some variables also enter significantly in the regressions that do not seem to be indicators of material injury.
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Date of creation: Feb 1993
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