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Une analyse empirique des décisions en matière d’antidumping aux États-Unis

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Author Info

  • Gasmi, Farid

    (Institut d’Économie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, France)

  • Hansen, Wendy L.

    (Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, États-Unis)

  • Laffont, Jean Jacques

    (Institut d’Économie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, France)

Abstract

U.S. firms seek regulation against foreign firms that are alleged to have dumped their goods in the U.S. market, preying on domestic firms. Regulators, empowered by the legislative body, administer antidumping laws to counter such practices. However, due to informational asymmetries that exist between the legislative body and domestic firms, and because of the discretionary power of the regulatory body, which is supposed to bridge this information gap, regulators may be captured. We examine the possibility of regulatory capture in the context of the administration of the U.S. Antidumping law. Les firmes américaines, qui deviennent la proie des firmes étrangères faisant du dumping sur le marché américain, réclament que ces dernières soient soumises à une réglementation. Jouissant des pleins pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés par le corps législatif, les législateurs mettent en application des lois antidumping pour contrer de telles pratiques. Toutefois, la présence d’asymétrie dans l’information entre le corps législatif et les firmes domestiques, à laquelle s’ajoute le pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’organisme de réglementation qui est sensé réduire cette asymétrie, pourraient rendre captifs les membres de cet organisme. Nous examinons la possibilité d’une réglementation captive dans le contexte de l’application des lois antidumping américaines.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 73 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars-juin-septembre)
Pages: 423-456

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:423-456

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  1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November.
  2. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
  3. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  4. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
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  6. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
  7. Levinsohn, J., 1994. "Competition Policy and International Trade," Working Papers 362, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
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  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Predation Without Reputation," Working papers 377, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  11. Klevorick, Alvin K, 1993. "The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 162-67, May.
  12. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
  13. Shoven,John B. (ed.), 1988. "Government Policy towards Industry in the United States and Japan," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521333252, October.
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Cited by:
  1. François Tandé, 2006. "Taxes antidumping et règle des faits disponibles," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1053-1063.

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