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Politics And Length Of Time To Bank Failure: 1986–1990

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  • RANDALL W. BENNETT
  • CHRISTINE LOUCKS

Abstract

This paper extends research on the savings and loan (S&L) industry to the banking industry in order to determine whether political influence affects the length of time from initial undercapitalization until ultimate bank failure. Results suggest that undercapitalized banks with representation on the House banking committee were allowed to remain open longer than were other undercapitalized banks. These results provide evidence that membership on relevant House committees matters.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall W. Bennett & Christine Loucks, 1996. "Politics And Length Of Time To Bank Failure: 1986–1990," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(4), pages 29-41, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:14:y:1996:i:4:p:29-41
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1996.tb00631.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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