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Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica

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  • Kenneth Mackenzie

    (University of Calgary)

Abstract

This survey article provides a microeconomic perspective of institutional design and public policy, focusing on the way the relations between voters, politicians and bureaucrats produce efficients outcomes in public policy. It points out the relevance of information and monitoring costs, competition and the structural features of institutions in the search of efficient results, and the way social scientists explain the failures of the political and burocratic markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:17-58
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/kmackenzie1.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institucional design; public policy; information costs; political markets; bureaucracy; public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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