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Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica

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  • Kenneth Mackenzie

    ()
    (University of Calgary)

Abstract

This survey article provides a microeconomic perspective of institutional design and public policy, focusing on the way the relations between voters, politicians and bureaucrats produce efficients outcomes in public policy. It points out the relevance of information and monitoring costs, competition and the structural features of institutions in the search of efficient results, and the way social scientists explain the failures of the political and burocratic markets.

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File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/kmackenzie1.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 1 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July-december)
Pages: 17-58

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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:17-58

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Keywords: institucional design; public policy; information costs; political markets; bureaucracy; public choice;

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References

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