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The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence

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  • James Bennett
  • William Orzechowski

Abstract

This paper has examined the voting behavior of bureaucrats and the consequences for elections. The economic theory of the rational voter predicts that bureaucrats would have more to gain by voting than the general public. The cost of voting is lower for public employees than for those who work in the private sector. As a consequence, theory predicts that bureaucrats would participate in elections at a greater rate than other individuals. As a test of the validity of the economic theory of voting, an empirical analysis of national elections from 1964 to 1978 was presented. The evidence is drawn from household survey data published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The data permit a direct observation of voting participation rates of public and private employees. The empirical results indicate that bureaucrats consistently participate in elections at significantly greater rates than non-bureaucrats. As the public sector expands and voter participation rates remain low, bureaucrats will exert disproportionate influence on election outcomes. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • James Bennett & William Orzechowski, 1983. "The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 271-283, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:2:p:271-283
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00210361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Russell Settle & Buron Abrams, 1976. "The determinants of voter participation: A more general model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 81-89, September.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    2. Facchini, Francois, 2014. "The determinants of public spending: a survey in a methodological perspective," MPRA Paper 53006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Stephen Mehay & Kenneth Seiden, 1986. "Municipal residency laws and local public budgets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 27-35, January.
    4. François Facchini & Abel François, 2005. "Territorial captivity and voter participation in national election: a theoretical and empirical analysis," Post-Print hal-00270739, HAL.
    5. Yosef Bhatti & Kasper Hansen, 2013. "Public employees lining up at the polls—the conditional effect of living and working in the same municipality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 611-629, September.
    6. Jake Rosenfeld, 2010. "Economic Determinants of Voting in an Era of Union Decline," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(2), pages 379-395, June.
    7. Al-Ississ, Mohamad & Atallah, Samer, 2015. "Patronage and ideology in electoral behavior: Evidence from Egypt's first presidential elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 241-248.
    8. Sieg, Holger & Wang, Yu, 2013. "The impact of unions on municipal elections and urban fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 554-567.
    9. Brian Dwight Baugus & George Diemer, 2016. "How Do Government Employees Influence Election Outcomes," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 61(2), pages 245-262, October.
    10. Bert Jaarsma & Arthur Schram & Frans Winden, 1986. "On the voting participation of public bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 183-187, January.
    11. Michael L. Marlow, 2013. "Public sector unions and government size," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(5), pages 466-470, March.
    12. Eugenia Toma & James Long, 1987. "Public employees' consumption of government goods: The case of education," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 289-296, January.
    13. Kevin M. O'Brien, 1997. "Do Municipal Residency Laws Affect Labour Market Outcomes?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 34(11), pages 1759-1769, November.

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