IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/jeehcn/v5y1994i2-3p26n6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Hummel Jeffrey Rogers
  • Lavoie Don

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 1-26, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:5:y:1994:i:2-3:p:26:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-1994-2-306
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/jeeh-1994-2-306
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/jeeh-1994-2-306?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Burns, Michael E & Walsh, Cliff, 1981. "Market Provision of Price-excludable Public Goods: A General Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 166-191, February.
    2. Brubaker, Earl R, 1975. "Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 147-161, April.
    3. Lee, Dwight R, 1977. "Discrimination and Efficiency in the Pricing of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 403-420, October.
    4. Mishan, E J, 1969. "The Relationship between Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 329-348, May/June.
    5. Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
    6. Head, John G & Shoup, Carl S, 1969. "Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 79(315), pages 567-572, September.
    7. James Coleman, 1966. "Individual interests and collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 49-62, December.
    8. Friedrich Schneider & Werner W. Pommerehne, 1981. "Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(4), pages 689-704.
    9. McMillan, John, 1979. "The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(149), pages 95-107, June.
    10. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    11. James M. Buchanan, 1962. "Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 10, pages 204-218, Palgrave Macmillan.
    12. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Hulett, Joe R, 1973. "Joint Supply, the Taussig-Pigou Controversy, and the Competitive Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 369-387, October.
    13. Borcherding, Thomas E, 1978. "Competition, Exclusion, and the Optimal Supply of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 111-132, April.
    14. Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Joint Supply and Price Discrimination," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 389-405, October.
    15. Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-599, September.
    16. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    17. Murray N. Rothbard, 1981. "The Myth of Neutral Taxation," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 1(2), pages 519-564, Fall.
    18. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    19. Samuelson, Paul A, 1969. "Contrast between Welfare Conditions for Joint Supply and for Public Goods," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 51(1), pages 26-30, February.
    20. Mancur Olson, Jr., & Richard Zeckhauser, 1967. "Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage, and Alliance Efficiency," NBER Chapters, in: Issues in Defense Economics, pages 25-63, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Thompson, Earl A, 1974. "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 755-782, July/Aug..
    22. Brubaker, Earl R, 1984. "Demand Disclosures and Conditions on Exclusion: An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(375), pages 536-553, September.
    23. Martin McGuire, 1974. "Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-126, June.
    24. Yoram Barzel & Eugene Silberberg, 1973. "Is the act of voting rational?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 51-58, September.
    25. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    26. Oakland, William H, 1974. "Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 927-939, Sept./Oct.
    27. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    28. Richard Wagner, 1966. "Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 161-170, December.
    29. Demsetz, Harold, 1970. "The Private Production of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 293-306, October.
    30. Kenneth Goldin, 1977. "Equal access vs. Selective access: A critique of public goods theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 53-71, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    2. Hollcombe, Randall J. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "The theory of the origin of the theory of public goods (conclusion) [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 191-207.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kamath Shyam J., 1994. "Privatization: A Market Prospect Perspective," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-52, March.
    2. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    3. Jesse Malkin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1991. "Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 355-378, October.
    4. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. Olesen, O. B., 1995. "Some unsolved problems in data envelopment analysis: A survey," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 5-36, April.
    6. Geoffrey Brennan & Dwight Lee & Cliff Walsh, 1983. "Monopoly Markets in Public Goods: the Case of the Uniform All-or-None Price," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(4), pages 465-490, October.
    7. Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell, 1986. "Interest groups and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-145, January.
    8. Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler, 1978. "The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 67-83, December.
    9. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    10. Brian C. Albrecht & Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2022. "Evolution, uncertainty, and the asymptotic efficiency of policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 169-188, July.
    11. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    12. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell M. Rhine, 2006. "On the size and growth of government," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jan), pages 13-30.
    13. Joe Oppenheimer, 1985. "Public choice and three ethical properties of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-255, January.
    14. Runge, C. Ford, 1985. "The Assurance Problem And Conjectural Variation In Public Goods Provision," Staff Papers 13548, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    15. Ryan C. Amacher & Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, 1975. "A Budget Size in a Democracy: A Review of the Arguments," Public Finance Review, , vol. 3(2), pages 99-122, April.
    16. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    17. Philip Jones, 2004. "‘All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(3), pages 450-468, October.
    18. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    19. Daniel Sutter, 1996. "Public Goods, Indivisible Goods, And Market Failure," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 133-143, July.
    20. Marmolo, Elisabetta, 1999. "A constitutional theory of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 27-42, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:5:y:1994:i:2-3:p:26:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.