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The theory of the origin of the theory of public goods (conclusion)
[Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]

Author

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  • Hollcombe, Randall J. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.)

    (Florida State University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

The article critically examines the traditional theory of public goods, it is an established part of the theory of public finance. The author shows that this theory in the form in which it is treated by its creators and authors of modern textbooks, can serve no empirical explanation for the production of a good in the public sector, no regulatory justification for such production. Then, the article developed political economy concept that the fact that some goods are produced and provided by the state, is due to the interests of the state, seeking to build up their own wealth and political power. In this context, the very theory of public goods and its promotion are explained as part of a system of institutions, ensuring the preservation and expansion of the power and influence of the state in society.

Suggested Citation

  • Hollcombe, Randall J. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "The theory of the origin of the theory of public goods (conclusion) [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 191-207.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1554
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holcombe, Randall G & Sobel, Russell S, 1995. "Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 47-58, April.
    2. Gonzalez, R A & Means, T S & Mehay, S L, 1993. "Empirical Tests of the Samuelsonian Publicness Parameter: Has the Right Hypothesis Been Tested?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 523-534, November.
    3. Leland B. Yeager, 1985. "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 259-294, Spring/Su.
    4. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0.
    5. Douglass C. North, 1988. "Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 15-28, Spring/Su.
    6. Ivanovic, Slobodan & Katic, Antonia & Mikinac, Kresimir, 2010. "Cluster As A Model Of Sustainable Competitiveness Of Small And Medium Enterpreneurship In The Tourist Market," UTMS Journal of Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, vol. 1(2), pages 45-54.
    7. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
    8. Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 1-26, June.
    9. Gordon, Scott, 1976. "The New Contractarians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 573-590, June.
    10. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    the theory of public goods; private production of public goods;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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