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James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future

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  • Randall G. Holcombe

    (Florida State University)

Abstract

A substantial amount of James Buchanan’s academic work was devoted to his constitutional project: the development of procedures for designing constitutional rules that would create a government sufficient to protect people’s rights but that would constrain government from violating people’s rights. Buchanan divides government functions into a protective state that preserves people’s rights and a productive state that produces collective goods that individuals could not produce on their own or through market mechanisms. Buchanan uses the benchmark of hypothetical agreement with the constitutional rules to evaluate whether they further the interests of those who are subject to them. This paper presents Buchanan’s constitutional project as a framework for analyzing constitutional rules and suggests how Buchanan’s framework can extend his constitutional project.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00821-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00821-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional political economy; James M. Buchanan; Social contract theory; Classical liberalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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