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Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

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  • George Crowley

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-012-9117-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 23 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 134-165

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:23:y:2012:i:2:p:134-165

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

    Related research

    Keywords: State constitutions; Spatial dependence; Diffusion; H73; H10;

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    1. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1988. "The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States," NBER Working Papers 2531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Joshua C. Hall & Justin M. Ross, 2010. "Tiebout Competition, Yardstick Competition, and Tax Instrument Choice: Evidence from Ohio School Districts," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(6), pages 710-737, November.
    3. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:255-277 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2007. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini," CESifo Working Paper Series 2017, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner & David C. Wheelock, 2005. "A spatial analysis of state banking regulation," Working Papers 2003-044, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    6. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    7. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-48, October.
    8. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    9. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1988. "The line item veto and public sector budgets : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 269-292, August.
    11. Holcombe, R.G., 1998. "Constitutional Theory and the Constitutional History of Colonial America," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University 1998_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    12. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
    13. Jon Fiva & Jørn Rattsø, 2007. "Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 457-470, September.
    14. SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    15. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. " Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    16. McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L., 1986. "An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 79-111, March.
    17. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    18. Gary Wagner & Russell Sobel, 2006. "State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 177-199, January.
    19. Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
    20. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    21. Erik Wibbels, 2005. "Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 161-188, 06.
    22. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
    23. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May.
    24. Dale Bails and Margie A. Tieslau, 2000. "The Impact of Fiscal Constitutions on State and Local Expenditures," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 20(2), Fall.
    25. Matsusaka, John G, 2000. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 619-50, October.
    26. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James M., 1978. "Tax instruments as constraints on the disposition of public revenues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 301-318, June.
    27. Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
    28. Maarten Allers & J. Elhorst, 2005. "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 493-513, August.
    29. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
    30. John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Direct Democracy Works," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 185-206, Spring.
    31. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Do constitutions cause large governments? Quasi-experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 908-918, May.
    32. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
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