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On the Delegation of Powers - with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe

In: Constitutions, Markets and Law

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  • Eli Salzberger
  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

The papers assembled in this volume deal with the question of what individual transition processes have taught us in terms of constitution-building. The book contains analyses of post 1989 constitutional developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from the perspectives of varied disciplines; including academics, politicians and the judiciary.

Suggested Citation

  • Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2002. "On the Delegation of Powers - with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe," Chapters, in: Stefan Voigt & Hans-Jürgen Wagener (ed.), Constitutions, Markets and Law, chapter 15, pages 221-286, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:2508_15
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
    2. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
    3. Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
    4. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Explaining Constitutional Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1847.
    5. Salzberger, Eli M., 1993. "A positive analysis of the doctrine of separation of powers, or: Why do we have an independent judiciary?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 349-379, December.
    6. Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, 2002. "Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Coiffard, 2018. "Independence of central banks after the crisis - focus on Hungary," IWE Working Papers 242, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    2. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
    3. Stefan Voigt, "undated". "Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1066, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    4. George Tridimas, 2004. "A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 99-116, July.
    5. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 249-269, September.

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