Political leadership, conflict, and the prospects for constitutional peace
AbstractThe emphasis on constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and, as a result, lower levels of welfare, this paper attempts to analyze why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. The key idea is that expressively motivated group members may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be found, would the expressive perspective alter the conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of constitutional reform that should be undertaken?
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4196.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Education and Society; Post Conflict Reintegration; Peace&Peacekeeping; Social Conflict and Violence; Services&Transfers to Poor;
Other versions of this item:
- Colin Jennings, 2007. "Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 83-94, January.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-04-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2007-04-21 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2007-04-21 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 2002. "Expressive Constitutionalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 299-311, December.
- Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2004. "Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 413-435, 03.
- Tyler Cowen, 2004. "A Road Map to Middle Eastern peace? -- A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 1-10, 01.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2002.
"Constitution or Conflict?,"
NBER Working Papers
8733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2004. "Constitution or Conflict?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 29-42, February.
- Acemoglu, Daron, 2003.
"Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
- Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward L. Glaeser, 2002.
"The Political Economy of Hatred,"
NBER Working Papers
9171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001.
"War and Democracy,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
- Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634, 9.
- Colin Jennings, 2008.
"Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland,"
0809, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Colin Jennings, 2011. "Intra-Group Competition And Inter-Group Conflict: An Application To Northern Ireland," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 63-83.
- Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008.
"Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership,"
0803, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
- Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
- repec:str:wpaper:0001 is not listed on IDEAS
- Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, 2011.
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 195-219, 07.
- Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2009. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," Working Papers 0918, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.