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Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers

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Author Info
Voigt, Stefan
Salzberger, Eli M

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Abstract

Elected politicians often choose to delegate competence to various agencies rather than deciding themselves. The paper deals with the apparent paradox that competence is being transferred despite the fact that politicians are assumed to maximize individual utility. The constitutional structure, which is assumed to be exogenously given, serves as the independent variable in deriving hypotheses concerning delegation behavior as the dependent variable. Two categories of delegation can be distinguished: domestic delegation--to agencies within the legislators' jurisdiction--and international delegation--to supranational or international bodies. The choice of the body to which decision-making powers are transferred has rarely been analyzed within a unified framework. The paper deals with this issue. Copyright 2002 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 55 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 289-310
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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:55:y:2002:i:2:p:289-310

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  1. Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," Working papers 08-193, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Stefan Voigt, . "Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1066, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  3. Birner, Regina & Anderson, Jock R., 2007. "How to make agricultural extension demand-driven?: The case of India's agricultural extension policy," IFPRI Discussion Papers 729, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
  4. Janina Satzer, . "Increased Heterogeneity as a Cause for Decreased Use of International Courts - the Case of the ICJ," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1152, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200429, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stefan Voigt & Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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