The constitutional theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock is extended to show that the greater the degree of consensus required for collective decisions, smaller will be the optimal scope of government activity. Furthermore, a requirement of more consensus in collective decision-making entails not only a more inclusive decision rule, but additional institutional changes designed to facilitate the reaching of agreement. These theoretical concepts are applied to the constitutional history of colonial America by examining the government of the Iroquois Indians, the Albany Plan of Union, the Articles of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Florida State University in its series Working Papers with number
1998_03_01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913 D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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