Constitutional Theory and the Constitutional History of Colonial America
AbstractThe constitutional theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock is extended to show that the greater the degree of consensus required for collective decisions, smaller will be the optimal scope of government activity. Furthermore, a requirement of more consensus in collective decision-making entails not only a more inclusive decision rule, but additional institutional changes designed to facilitate the reaching of agreement. These theoretical concepts are applied to the constitutional history of colonial America by examining the government of the Iroquois Indians, the Albany Plan of Union, the Articles of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Florida State University in its series Working Papers with number 1998_03_01.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, March.
- George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
- Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitry Ryvkin).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.