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Direct Democracy Works

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  • John G. Matsusaka

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to describe the practice and theory of the increasingly important political phenomenon of direct democracy and the main lessons from the scholarly literature. Many questions remain to be answered, but the emerging view is that direct democracy works--allowing the general public to participate in lawmaking often seems to improve the performance of government.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0895330054048713
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 185-206

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:2:p:185-206

Note: DOI: 10.1257/0895330054048713
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