Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending
AbstractThis paper uses cross-section data on the U.S. states to test the hypothesis that budgeting and borrowing rules affect the level and composition of public spending. It employs a 1963 data set with detailed information on state capital budgeting practices to compare capital spending in states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures and states that employ a unified budget It also investigates the impact of financing rules, in particular pay-as-you-go rules for capital projects, on the level of spending. States with capital budgets tend to spend more on public capital, especially if they do not impose pay-as-you-go requirements for financing capital projects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 56 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- James Poterba, 1992. "Capital Budgets, Borrowing Rules, and State Capital Spending," NBER Working Papers 4235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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