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Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto

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Author Info

  • Dearden, James A
  • Husted, Thomas A

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the impact of the governor's line-item veto on the state budget process. The governor's ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness, rather than a smaller expenditure budget. The percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor's original budget request over fiscal years 1983-89 is examined. The emprical results indicate that under certain political situations the line-item veto authority enhances the governor's ability to obtain his or her desired budget. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 77 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 707-23

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:4:p:707-23

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Aidt, T.S. & Giovannoni,F., 2005. "Critical Decisions and Constitutional Rules," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0523, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  2. Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
  3. de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.

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