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Critical Decisions and Constitutional Rules

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Author Info
Aidt, T.S.
Giovannoni,F.

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Abstract

Many constitutions specify procedures that allow critical decisions to be made with a different rule from day-to-day decisions. We propose a theory of constitutional rules that explains why. The theory is based on the assumption that the type of decision can be observed, but not verified. We characterise two classes of second-best constitution, both with clear analogues in real world constitutions: i) incentive scheme (IS) constitutions that elicit information about the type of decision through costly decision rule switching procedures, and ii) linking scheme (LS) constitutions that grant limited veto powers to interested parties. We explore how the relative performance of the IS and LS constitution depends on the economic environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0523.

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Length: 44
Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0523

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Related research
Keywords: constitutions social contracts majority rules vetoes referenda

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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  1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Francesco Giovannoni & Toke S. Aidt, 2004. "Constitutional Rules," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 540, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Edward J. Green, 1994. "Individual Level Randomness in a Nonatomic Population," GE, Growth, Math methods 9402001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. " Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2003. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2003. "Endogenous Constitutions," Seminar Papers 726, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2004. "Voting on Majority Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 115-132, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-26.

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