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Districting and Government Overspending

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  • Reza Baqir

Abstract

Theories of government spending driven by a common-pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that, when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for, greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity. The results also show that at-large electoral systems do not, and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do, break this relationship.

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  • Reza Baqir, 2002. "Districting and Government Overspending," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1318-1354, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:6:p:1318-1354
    DOI: 10.1086/342804
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