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The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy

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  • Lars P. Feld

Abstract

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives? potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the Euro¬pean Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU le¬vel. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competen¬cies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European fede¬ration should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.

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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2005-20.

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Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2005-20

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Keywords: European Constitutional Convention; Bill of Rights; Separation of Powers; Competitive Federalism; Referendums; European demos.;

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  1. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgassner, 1999. "Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? Some Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 151-180 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  16. Lars P. Feld & Justina A.V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2006. "The Effect of Direct Democracy on Income Redistribution:Evidence for Switzerland," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 23, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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  34. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-48, October.
  35. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 301-325.
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Cited by:
  1. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2013. "On the dynamics of legal convergence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 345-356, July.
  2. Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  3. Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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