Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants
AbstractRecent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referen-dum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2005-21.
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Budget Referendums; Intergovernmental Grants; Interest Group Influence;
Other versions of this item:
- Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2005. "Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 147-169, April.
- Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Voters as a hard budget constraint: On the determination of intergovernmental grants," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200418, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-08-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-08-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2005-08-03 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-08-03 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2005-08-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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