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The selection principle and market failure in systems competition

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  • Sinn, Hans-Werner

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 66 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 247-274

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:66:y:1997:i:2:p:247-274

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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References

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  1. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434.
  2. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Competitive jurisdictions, congestion, and the Henry George Theorem : When should property be taxed instead of land?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 351-370, November.
  3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 19846, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  5. Charles M. Tiebout, 1961. "An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization," NBER Chapters, in: Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization, pages 79-96 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  7. Boadway, Robin, 1980. "A note on the market provision of club goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 131-137, February.
  8. Oakland, William H., 1972. "Congestion, public goods and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 339-357, November.
  9. Musgrave, Richard A, 1969. "Theories of Fiscal Federalism," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 24(4), pages 521-36.
  10. Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September.
  11. Bewley, Truman F, 1981. "A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 713-40, May.
  12. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
  13. Richter, Wolfram F., 1994. "The efficient allocation of local public factors in Tiebout's tradition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 323-340, June.
  14. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  15. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1995. "Social Insurance, Incentives, and Risk Taking," NBER Working Papers 5335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  17. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
  18. Wildasin, D.E., 1991. "Ralaxation of Barriers to factor Mobilty and Income Redistribution," Papers 92-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  19. Pines, David, 1991. "Tiebout without politics," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 469-489, November.
  20. Wilson, Charles A, 1979. "Equilibrium and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 313-17, May.
  21. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June.
  22. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  23. Holcombe, Randall G & Sobel, Russell S, 1995. " Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 47-58, April.
  24. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September.
  25. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  26. Berglas, Eitan & Pines, David, 1981. "Clubs, local public goods and transportation models : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 141-162, April.
  27. Brueckner, Jan K., 1981. "Congested public goods: The case of fire protection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 45-58, February.
  28. Walzer, Norman, 1972. "Economies of Scale and Municipal Police Services: The Illinois Experience," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 54(4), pages 431-38, November.
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