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Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government

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  • Steunenberg, Bernard

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of different institutional arrangements of representative government. More specifically, the effects of obligatory fiscal referendum, voter initiative, and veto power of an elected official of the executive branch (for instance, the mayor) on the level of expenditure are analyzed. Moreover, the influence of agenda setting power of bureaucracy on outcomes is compared with a case in which the legislature is able to introduce amendments. Copyright 1992 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 45 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 501-29

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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:45:y:1992:i:4:p:501-29

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962

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Cited by:
  1. Lars P. Feld, 2005. "The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  2. Bruno S. Frey, . "Direct Democracy for Transition Countries," IEW - Working Papers 165, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Lars P. Feld & Justina A. V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2006. "The effect of direct democracy on income redistribution: evidence for Switzerland," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19287, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Anke Kessler, 2005. "Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 9-38, January.
  5. Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, 2012. "Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 77-95, January.
  6. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200423, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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